Forcing Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience by unknown
Forcing Technology: The Clean
Air Act Experience
The Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Union Electric Co. v. EPA1
held that states have the authority under the Clean Air Amendments
of 19702 to require stationary sources of air pollution to comply with
regulatory standards or shut down, even if the state's emission control
requirements are economically or technically impossible to achieve.
The Court found that Congress intended the Amendments to induce
rapid improvements in air pollution control technology, to be, in other
words, "technology-forcing." 3 This approach to innovation has been
criticized, however, as unrealistic and unsuccessful. 4
1. 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7626
(West Supp. 1978)). The Clean Air Act was extensively amended in 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-95, 91 Stat. 686 (1977); Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1399 (1977) (technical amendments).
In this Note, sections of the current version of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7626 (West
Supp. 1978), will be cited without cross-reference.
3. 427 U.S. at 257. The term "technology-forcing" first appeared in cases and com-
mentaries in 1975. See, e.g., Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 91
(1975); Bonine, The Evolution of "Technology-Forcing" in the Clean Air Act, ENVIR.
REP. (BNA), Monograph No. 21, 1975.
The Court held in Union Electric that a state implementation plan (SIP) required by
§ 110 of the Act could not be rejected "on the ground that it is economically or techno-
logically infeasible." 427 U.S. at 265-66.
This ruling resolved a sharp division among the circuits over the treatment of claims
of economic and technological infeasibility. Compare Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 515
F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) and Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA,
509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975) (economic and technological infeasibility irrelevant to state
plan approval) with St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated as
moot, 425 U.S. 987 (1976) and Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 168-69 (6th Cir.
1973) (feasibility must be considered in state plan approval). But see Bunker Hill Co. v.
EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1294 (9th Cir. 1977) (9th Circuit ignores Union Electric; requires
EPA to show SIP emission limitation "is economically and technologically feasible").
State implementation plans are the Act's primary mechanism for achieving compliance
with (1) National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQSs) set by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) under § 109, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409 (West Supp. 1978); (2) the
standards set by the states under § 116, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7416 (West Supp. 1978); and (3) the
requirements contained in § 101 and §§ 160-69, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401, 7470-79 (West Supp.
1978). The overall statutory structure was intended to force control technology innovation
to the level necessary to meet national air quality standards. Union Electric Co. v. EPA,
427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976); Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 91
(1975).
4. See, e.g., Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 269-72 (1976) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (questioning wisdom of policy that would close electric powerplants for non-
compliance); Ayres, Enforcement of Air Pollution Controls on Stationary Sources Under
the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 441, 444-45 (1975); La Pierre, Tech-
nology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IowA L. REv. 771,
790-93 (1977).
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This Note evaluates the technical and financial responses of the
copper smelting and electric power industries to the Clean Air Act
and establishes that technology-forcing works. The evaluation also
shows, however, that the Act creates obstacles to continued emission-
control innovation. Without such innovation, severe air pollution
damage will continue to occur despite compliance with the present
type of technology-forcing standards. The Note concludes that Con-
gress should amend the Act, and that the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) should interpret existing authority, to require continued
private emission-control innovation, at a cost that approximates the
cost of continued air pollution damage.
I. Technology-Forcing Doctrine
In 1970, Congress enacted comprehensive legislation that forced
private emission control innovation; this aim was controversial because
it assumed that legal commands would induce technical innovation.
Responding to difficulties in the 1970 Act, Congress amended the
legislation in 1977.
A. The Clean Air Amendments of 1970
Congress enacted the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 because earlier
state and federal air pollution control efforts had failed.5 The primitive
state of control technology0 and the low level of funding for private
control-technology research, development, and demonstration 7 were
5. See J. ESPOSITO, VANISHING AIR (1970); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSESSMENT OF
FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS TO CONTROL AIR POLLUTION FROM STATIONARY
SOURCES (1973). Harmful emissions increased sharply between 1940 and 1970, particularly
during the 1960s. See OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, EPA AP-115,
NATIONWIDE AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION TRENDS, 1940-1970 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
EMISSION TRENDS].
In addition to their stationary source provisions, the 1970 Amendments attempted to
hasten automotive emission-control innovation by requiring cars produced in or after
1975 to emit only 10% of the air pollution produced by 1970 automobiles. Clean Air Act,
§ 202(b)(1)(A), 84 Stat. 1690 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521(b)(1)(A) (West
Supp. 1978)).
6. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970), reprinted in SENATE COMM.
ON PUBLIC WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, S. DOG.
No. 18, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 409 (1974) (" 'Air pollution control requires a new and
unique technology.'") [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1196 with page references to
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; Sherwood, Must We Breathe Sulfur Oxides? TECHNOLOGY REV.,
Jan. 1970, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 1027 (technology did not exist to
effectively control sulfur dioxide emissions).
7. J. ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 26-68 (slow pace and low funding of private auto
emission control research); id. at 104-11 (slow progress and low funding of sulfur dioxide
control research).
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major causes of these failures. The 1970 Amendments responded to
these problems and attempted to stimulate private innovation in two
ways. First, section III required new or extensively modified sources
of air pollution to meet federal new source performance standards
(NSPSs), standards based on an aggressive technology-forcing definition
of affordable and demonstrated control systems.8 Second, states could
require existing sources to achieve technically or economically in-
feasible emission limitations as part of the state implementation plan
(SIP) required by section 110.9
The state emission limitations, most of which were set in early 1972,
were intended to achieve sufficient emission reduction to allow each
state to attain primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQSs) by mid-1975.' 0 These standards specify the limits on pollu-
tant concentrations in ambient air that, "allowing an adequate margin
of safety, are requisite to protect the public health.""
The decision in Union Electric Co. v. EPA affirmed the states'
authority to set economically or technically infeasible emission limita-
tions where necessary to achieve NAAQSs. 12 Although the Supreme
8. Clean Air Act, § 1ll(a)(1), 84 Stat. 1683 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411
(Vest Supp. 1978)). Although NSPSs may not be based on "purely theoretical or ex-
perimental" control capabilities, the standard need not be "routinely achieved within
the industry prior to its adoption." Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427,
433-34 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974); accord, Portland Cement Ass'n
v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 391-92, 401-02 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921
(1974). NSPSs were meant to be revised frequently to provide incentives for the "constant
improvement" of control technology and "to avoid having new plants comply with out-
dated standards." S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 6, at 417. No NSPSs had been revised,
however, by the time the 1977 Amendments were enacted. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTER-
STATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, CLEAN AIR Aar AMENDMENTS OF 1977, H.R. REP. No. 294,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 11, 194 (1977). Congress now requires review of NSPSs every four
years for possible revisions. Clean Air Act, § 111(b)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (West
Supp. 1978). Nonetheless, EPA missed both the statutory deadline and the later court-
ordered deadline for an important standard governing fossil-fuel powerplants. See 9
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2246 (March 30, 1979); id. at 543 (Aug. 5, 1978).
9. Clean Air Act, § 110, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978).
10. See Clean Air Act, § 110(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1978)
(requiring attainment of primary NAAQSs within three years of SIP submission). At the
time a state plan is submitted, a governor may petition the EPA Administrator for a two-
year extension of the compliance deadline. Id. § 110(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(e) (West Supp.
1978).
11. Id. § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409(b)(1) (West Supp. 1978). In addition to the
primary standards, secondary NAAQSs have been established to provide ambient air
quality levels "requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated
adverse effects." Id. § 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409(b)(2) (West Supp. 1978). The Act did
not require these secondary standards to be met as rapidly as primary standards so long
as they were met within a "reasonable time." Clean Air Act, § 110(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7410(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1978). Secondary standards do not and cannot state ambient
air quality levels that would prevent all air pollution damage, however, because some
pollutants will cause damage at any level. See pp. 1730-31 infra.
12. 427 U.S. 246, 265-66 (1976).
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Court held in an earlier case that states could weaken their require-
ments or extend a source's compliance deadline if the national am-
bient standards would not be violated,1 3 other courts held that the
Act's provision aimed at the prevention of significant air quality de-
terioration prohibited EPA from embarking on a national policy of
dispersing sources instead of abating emissions.' 4 Thus sources could
not escape emission-control requirements by locating in clean air areas.
Similarly, courts construed the term "emission limitations" to prevent
sources from substituting dispersion methods such as tall smokestacks
for continuous emission-reduction technology.' 5 These decisions pre-
vented sources from evading emission-control requirements that often
demanded the use of innovative control technology.
B. The 1977 Amendments
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 197710 made major changes in
the Act that were designed to force continued innovation. Congress
13. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975) (interpreting § 110
to allow states to revise plans to grant variances not violating NAAQSs); Mision In-
dustrial, Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123 (1st Cir. 1976) (Puerto Rico allowed to weaken sulfur
oxide control regulations despite potentially hazardous pollutant levels derived from
sulfur oxide emissions). These decisions significantly weakened the effectiveness of § 110
as a technology-forcing mechanism; by permitting the states and EPA to grant variances
more easily to sources pressed by the Act's requirements, the sources most likely to need
to install innovative controls could be exempted from technology-forcing. As long as
NAAQSs were met, variances could be given in the form of an SIP revision made by the
state with EPA approval. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 91
(1975).
14. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1119-21 (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated as moot,
434 U.S. 809 (1977); Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd by
an equally divided court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
During 1971 and 1972, EPA took the position that as long as states attained ambient
air standards, it had no authority to impose further control requirements through a policy
of preventing significant deterioration. See 344 F. Supp. at 254-56. This policy, together
with new source performance standards for powerplants and the administration's proposal
to tax sulfur emissions only in areas failing to comply with NAAQSs for SO., would have
encouraged construction of major new coal-fired electric generating capacity in clean-air
western areas. See Nondegradation Policy of the Clean Air Act: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 93d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 14-16, 18-19 (1973) (statement of Laurence I. Moss) [hereinafter cited as 1973
Hearings]. These new powerplants could comply with new source performance standards
without using SO2 emission-control technology because local coal was low in sulfur. See
note 51 infra (NSPSs set to allow compliance by burning low-sulfur fuel). Despite com-
pliance with NSPSs, however, these new powerplants would cause considerable and avoid-
able air quality deterioration. See 1973 Hearings, supra, at 14-16, 18-19. Sierra Club v.
Ruckelshaus reversed this de facto EPA policy of national source dispersion on the grounds
that the policy violated § 101 of the Clean Air Act.
15. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp., Nev. Mines Div. v. Costle (Kennecott II), 572
F.2d 1349, 1354 (9th Cir. 1978); Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16, 20-22 (6th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).




attempted to deal with the air quality problems caused by industrial
growth by adding two new parts to Title I: Part C codified much of
EPA's former prevention-of-significant-deterioration regulations; 17 Part
D codified the EPA's ruling imposing strict standards on industrial
growth in areas not attaining ambient air quality standards.' 8 New
sources locating in an area with air cleaner than national standards
must use the "best available control technology,"' 9 while new sources
locating in an area with air dirtier than national standards must com-
ply with the "lowest achievable emission rate" 20 attained anywhere in
the country for such a source. Both requirements should spur innova-
tion because each is defined on a case-by-case basis to incorporate the
latest technological improvements; in no case may either requirement
be weaker than the new source performance standards.21
In addition, the 1977 Amendments set special ambient air require-
ments for clean and dirty air regions. Ambient air quality require-
ments were tightened by limiting permissible degradation in most
clean air areas to less than the national standards would permit.22
Similarly, new sources locating in nonattainment areas may not cause
any additional degradation; they must pay existing sources to reduce
emissions by an amount equivalent to or greater than the emissions
that the new sources will produce while operating at the lowest
achievable emission rate.2 3 These control-technology and ambient air
quality requirements encourage technological innovation in expand-
ing industries because they make industrial expansion contingent upon
the development of better emission controls.
17. Clean Air Act, §§ 160-169A, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7470-7491 (Vest Supp. 1978); 39 Fed.
Reg. 42,514 (1974). These regulations govern industrial growth in clean air areas, limiting
development that would degrade air quality.
18. See Clean Air Act, §§ 171-78, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7501-08 (West Supp. 1978) (codifying
EPA Ruling at 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976)).
19. Clean Air Act, § 165(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7475(a)(4) (West Supp. 1978). Best avail-
able control technology is defined on a case-by-case basis by the permitting authority,
but it cannot be less stringent than what NSPSs require. Id. § 169(3), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7479(3) (West Supp. 1978).
20. Id. § 173(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7503(2) @Vest Supp. 1978). Lowest achievable emission
rate is to be defined on the basis of either the most stringent state requirement for such
a source anywhere in the country or the most stringent emission limitation achieved in
actual practice, whichever sets the tighter standard. Id. § 171(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7501(3)
(West Supp. 1978).
21. Id. §§ 169(3), 171(3), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7479(3), 7501(3) (West Supp. 1978).
22. Id. §§ 163(b), 165(d), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 173(b), 175(d) (West Supp. 1978) (standards for
sulfur dioxide and particulates). See id. § 166(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7476(a) (West Supp. 1978)
(EPA must develop standards for hydrocarbons, photochemical oxidants, nitrogen oxides,
and carbon monoxide).
23. Id. § 173, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7503 (West Supp. 1978) (barring increases in emissions in
nonattainment areas); 44 Fed. Reg. 3274 (1979) (amending EPA's nonattainment area
interpretative ruling). Details about purchasing emission reductions remain unclear.
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The Amendments greatly strengthened EPA's enforcement powers,
both by adding civil penalties to the Act's sanctions 24 and by requiring
that noncomplying stationary sources pay a penalty equal to the sum
the source saved by delaying compliance beyond July 1, 1979.25 These
sanctions should be more effective than the injunctive relief and
criminal penalties authorized under the 1970 Amendments.2-6
If a source secures EPA approval to demonstrate innovative control
technology, the source may be exempted from delayed compliance
penalties until July 1, 1982; by that time the source will be in com-
pliance if the demonstration is successful.27 Similar exemptions ensure
that new sources that receive advance EPA approval to demonstrate
innovative control technology will not be penalized if the demonstra-
tion fails.28 In addition, EPA must now review the standards for new
sources every four years and revise them where control technology has
improved, thereby requiring firms to keep pace with control-technology
improvements. 29
II. Analyses of Technology-Forcing
The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 induced substantial private
emission-control innovation. Examination of the copper smelting and
electric power industries-two industries pressed hard by the Act's re-
24. See Clean Air Act, § 113(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(b) (West Supp. 1978).
25. See id. § 120(d)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7420(d)(2) (West Supp. 1978).
26. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 113 (current version at 42
U.S.C.A. § 7413 (West Supp. 1978)). Neither injunctive relief nor criminal penalties are
well-suited to enforcing stationary source emission control requirements. It is unlikely
that courts would close major industrial plants with thousands of employees or power-
plants serving thousands of people. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp., Nev. Mines Div. v.
Train (Kennecott II), 424 F. Supp. 1217 (D. Nev. 1976), rev'd sub nom., Kennecott Copper
Corp., Nev. Mines Div. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978) (court permits smelter
to remain open). Although a court could order a source to comply, the violator would
have suffered no financial penalty for his delay. Criminal penalties require time-con-
suming investigations and trials. In addition, EPA's enforcement division has been and
continues to be understaffed, inadequately informed on compliance status, and hesitant
to seek legal enforcement of the Agency's administrative orders. See, e.g., GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, CED 78-165, IMPROVEMENTs NEEDED IN CONTROLLING MAJOR AIR POLLU-
TION SOURCES 5-11, 15-18 (1978) (discussing hesitancy to enforce agency orders and in-
adequate supervision of polluters); The Continuing Crisis in Environmental Enforcement,
The New Lawyer, September 1978, at 1, col. 1 (inadequate enforcement personnel in
both EPA and state air pollution control agencies); Blazey, Economic Tradeoffs in
Pollution A batement, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, Winter 1979, at 3, col. 1 (ABA Standing Comm.
on Environmental Law Newsletter) (EPA enforcement perceived as "paper tiger" by many
polluters).
27. Clean Air Act, § 113(d)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(d)(4) (West Supp. 1978).
28. See id. § 111(j), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(j) (West Supp. 1978).
29. See id. § 111(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1978).
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quirements-proves that statutes can force technical innovation.3 0 Prior
analyses of technology-forcing have focused on compliance as the mea-
sure of the Clean Air Act's effectiveness in stimulating innovation.31
The Act's ability to stimulate private pilot and full-scale control tech-
nology demonstrations, however, is a better measure of technology-
forcing success than the extent of industry compliance with existing
standards. Compliance status depends as heavily on enforcement effec-
tiveness, revisions of standards, and other political factors as it does on
control technology capabilities.3 2 Furthermore, installed control sys-
tems rarely represent the most current advance in control technology.3 3
Demonstration efforts are highly sensitive to investment risks.34
Technology-forcing requirements such as those contained in state
implementation plans increase investment risks because they increase
uncertainties about the number of sources needing innovative control
technology and about the specifications of that technology. By the
same token, technology-forcing standards such as the new source stan-
dards reduce these uncertainties, but at the expense of creating finan-
cial penalties for continued innovation. Case studies establish that
government regulations can force innovation, but that the SIP and
NSPS requirements are neither designed nor well-suited to do so.
A. The Copper Smelting Industry
Copper smelting is inherently dirty; the fifteen domestic primary
copper smelters accounted for approximately ten percent of the na-
tional sulfur dioxide (SO 2) emissions in 1970.35 Most of these smelters
continually violated the air quality standard for SO 2 issued by EPA in
1971, and thus faced the "clean up or close" dilemma.3 6 For some
20. These two industries were selected for study because they both caused massive
sulfur dioxide air pollution problems and neither had adequate technical solutions, yet
the industries differed significantly in size, market structure, and production technology.
31. See Ayres, supra note 4, at 444-45; La Pierre, supra note 4, at 790-93. Both com-
mentators, using compliance as the test, concluded that technology-forcing failed.
32. See note 26 supra (discussing enforcement problems); note 54 infra (weakening
regulations).
33. See pp. 1724-26 infra (discussing rapid improvements in scrubber technology).
34. See R. GILPIN, JOINT EcONOMIC COMM., TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 41 (1975) (economic studies conclude
uncertainty and thus risk is chief obstacle to industrial innovation).
35. Copper smelters emitted about 3.6 million tons of SO, in 1970; total national
SO. emissions were about 34 million tons. EMISSION TRENDS, supra note 5, at 21-22, 47.
Sulfur oxides, measured as SO, were one of six pollutants for which national ambient
air quality standards were set in 1971. 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1977).
36. Only the smelter at White Pine, Michigan, owned by Copper Range Corporation,
was in compliance with the EPA's standards when they were issued in 1971 and Copper
Range was in compliance only because the ore smelted tended to be quite low in sulfur.
Copper Range Co., Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-K, at 9 (1975) [here-
inafter 10-K forms cited as SEC Form 10-K].
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smelters, only economically ruinous control technology was available.37
Both locally and through the federal government, the smelting firms
applied massive pressure on the states to weaken SIP requirements.38
By the time state plans were submitted in January 1972 for EPA ap-
proval, control requirements for eight smelters had been deleted from
the Arizona and Montana plans3" and requirements affecting several
smelters in other states had been weakened.40 Although the EPA soon
disapproved the SIP requirements affecting eleven of these smelters,
the agency then delayed up to five years in issuing substitute emission
limitations for the affected installations. 41
Although this slow, weak, control program did stimulate the in-
37. See Letter from Robert Sansom, Assistant Administrator for Air and Water Pro-
grams, to Richard Ayres, Natural Resources Defense Council, at 2-3 (Dec. 7, 1973)
(predicting smelter closures and production curtailments from expense of continuous
emission controls) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Capital expenditures for smelter
compliance have been high, totaling more than $300 million committed or planned in
mid-1973, see OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, EPA, EPA-450/ 2-74-002a,
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR NEw-SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: PRIMARY COPPER,
ZINC, AND LEAD SMELTERS, Vol. 1: PROPOSED STANDARDS at 6-48 to 6-49 (1974) (detailing
compliance plans and spending by each smelter) [hereinafter cited as SMELTER NSPS
DOCUMENT], and almost $1 billion committed or spent as of Jan. 1, 1978, see, e.g., Ken-
necott Copper Co., SEC Form 10-K, 10 (1977) ($390 million compliance spending);
Phelps-Dodge Co., SEC Form 10-K, 5 (1977) ($300 million compliance spending). Because
of these high compliance costs, EPA modified certain regulations. See, e.g., ASARCO,
Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 328 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (striking down EPA redefinition of
modified sources made under extreme pressure from industry and Commerce Department).
38. In 1970, Arizona, Montana, and Washington adopted state emission limitations
requiring 90% control of sulfur dioxide. In its proposed guidelines for the preparation
of state plans, the EPA included this 90% standard as a sample emission limitation for
smelters. 36 Fed. Reg. 6693 (proposed 40 C.F.R. § 51) (1971). The copper industry, work-
ing through the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Commerce, and
the White House, forced EPA to rewrite this sample standard in its final guidelines. See
40 C.F.R. § 51, Appendix B, 3.4 (1977). These changes were made after the public com-
ment period had closed, when the final regulations were at the printers. See Implementa-
tion of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Parts 1 and 2 (Title 1): Hearings before
the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7, 26-27 (1972) (statement of Richard E. Ayres) [hereinafter cited as
1972 Hearings].
39. See 1972 Hearings, supra note 38, at 146-47.
40. See id. at 37 (requirements for Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah).
41. EPA disapproved the Arizona, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, and Utah
SIP requirements for thirteen copper and lead smelters as inadequate. 37 Fed. Reg.
10841, 10849, 10861, 10877, 10879, 10882, 10898 (1972) (listing disapproved SIP require-
ments); EPA, EPA-450/2-75-008, STATE AIR POLLUTION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN PROGRESS
REPORT, JAN. I TO JUNE 30, 1975 at 15 (1975). As of July 1975, substitute SIP requirements
had been promulgated for only one smelter. Id. By 1977, EPA still had not promulgated
substitute emission limitations for several smelters in Arizona and Montana. See 40
C.F.R. §§ 52.125, 52.134 (1977) (Arizona sulfur oxide control strategy and compliance
schedules; none listed for Phelps-Dodge or Kennecott smelters); 43 Fed. Reg. 40,240




dustry to conduct major demonstrations of environmentally beneficial
technology, the industry spent far more developing clean new smelting
technologies than in developing controls for existing smelters.42 This
concentration on new technologies failed to address the continuing
problem of pollution from existing facilities. The industry conducted
major demonstrations of emission-free smelting processes43 and of im-
proved disposal methods or uses for the sulfuric acid and other sulfur
compounds produced by conventional emission controls. 4 4 An in-
dustry-funded trade association conducted more limited demonstra-
tions of emission control devices for existing smelters' air pollution
42. The figures shown below demonstrate the heavy emphasis on new process develop-
ment over new control technology development, an emphasis that continues even when
development expenditures for intermittent control systems are included.
ESTIMATED ANNUAL COPPER SMELTER EMISSION-CONTROL RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMONSTRATION EXPENDITURES BY RESEARCH AREA
($ Millions)
Research Area 1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 total
New Processes1  4.4 6.8 6.9 6.3 5.9 5.2 5.1 3.3 46.0
Intermittent controls -  0.4 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 8.7
Byproduct disposal 3  0.9 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5; 7.6
Controls for
existing smelters' 0.8' 1.1 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 0.8 0.75 12.0
Table notes:
I. Anaconda Corporation's commercial demonstration of its Arbiter process accounted
for the bulk of these expenditures, but all the major smelting firms mounted large and
continuing efforts in this area. Expenditures are understated here because Duval Corpora-
tion's demonstration expenses are not included. See notes 43, 46, 47 infra.
2. These intermittent control system expenditures include far more computer work and
far less hardware development than the other categories.
3. These efforts were directed primarily toward developing new ways to convert or
dispose of the sulfuric acid produced by existing emission-control technology (acid
plants) or to bypass the acid plant stage and directly produce elemental sulfur. The most
noteworthy of these conversion efforts was the ASARCO-Phelps-Dodge effort to produce
elemental sulfur at ASARCO's El Paso smelter. See note 46 infra.
4. These efforts were made to control the weak SO, gas streams from reverberatory
furnaces.
5. Author's estimates based on interviews and correspondence with industry personnel
(sources on file Yale Law Journal).
43. See Letters from James Henderson, ASARCO, Inc. (Oct. 2, 1978); Richard Pendleton,
Phelps-Dodge (Sept. 28, 1978); Ivor Pickering, Kennecott Corp. (Oct. 4, 1978); telephone
interview with George Wunder, Anaconda Corp. (March 9, 1977) (letters and notes on
file Yale Law Journal); Pennzoil, SEC Form 10-K, at 16, 18-19 (1972) (discussing Duval,
Inc., a Pennzoil subsidiary). Anaconda and Duval each commercially demonstrated emis-
sion-free processes by building new smelters using them. Anaconda, Corporate Report
11-12 (1974); SMELTER NSPS DOCUMENT, supra note 37, at 5-15.
44. See note 43 sutra (citing interviews and letters). These by-products were primarily
sulfuric acid and other sulfur compounds. Estimated annual expenditures are given in
note 42, supra.
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problems.45 But all these demonstrations tended to be pursued only in
the infrequent cases when the EPA and the states attempted to enforce
rigorous standards.46
The experience of the copper smelting industry establishes that in-
novation can be forced, that industries misallocate innovative efforts
towards new productive technologies, and that vigorous enforcement
directly affects the establishment of demonstration programs. 47 These
results are not unique to the copper smelting industry, however, as
analysis of technology-forcing in the electric power industry demon-
strates.
B. Technology-Forcing in the Electric Power Industry
When Congress enacted the 1970 Amendments, coal-fired power-
plants were causing more than half the national SO2 pollution,4" and
these emissions were increasing rapidly with the expansion of coal-fired
generating capacity.49 Both federal and state standards developed after
45. This trade association, the Smelter Control Research Association, tested devices
such as flue-gas-desulfurization (FGD) scrubbers. See Letter from Ivor Pickering, supra
note 43. The association is now called the Smelter Environmental Research Association.
Id.
46. For instance Duval's decision to build its own smelter was substantially affected by
production curtailments placed on ASARCO's El Paso smelter in order to meet Texas air
quality standards. See Pennzoil, SEC Form 10-K, at 16, 18-19 (1972); ASARCO, Inc., SEC
Form 10-K, at A18 (1977) (noting reduced need to curtail production as El Paso smelter
moved to comply). In another case, ASARCO, with Phelps-Dodge, demonstrated an
ambitious elemental sulfur recovery process as part of a 1970 consent judgment. See N.
LANDAU & P. RHEINGOLD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAw HANDBOOK 275 (1972) (quoting consent
judgment).
47. Rather than close several smelters, Congress provided special relief in the 1977
Amendments by granting up to 10 years' additional time to comply with state emission
limitations, provided that affected firms used intermittent control systems and com-
mitted "reasonable resources" to research and development of appropriate emission-
control technology. Clean Air Act, § 119(d)(1)(C)(ii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7419(d)(1)(C)(ii) (West
Supp. 1978). The Agency proposed to define reasonable effort in terms of emission-control
demonstrations and to require affected firms to spend enough to carry out these demon-
strations. See 44 Fed. Reg. 6301-02 (1979) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 57.601-.606)
(nonferrous smelter order regulations). The Agency failed, however, to specify any
method by which smelting firms or environmentalists could calculate how expensive an
emission control demonstration program should be proposed. See id. Furthermore, "en-
forceable intermittent control system" may be a contradiction in terms because of severe
monitoring problems. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Comments on Proposed
Rules Regarding Use of Supplementary Control Systems 11-20 (1974), reprinted in 120
CONG. REc. 18968-72 (June 12, 1974); id. at 15, 120 CONG. REC. 18970 (Texas official states
"the only [intermittent control) system" he knew about was that "a hell of a lot of copper
is smelted [at El Paso plant] when the wind blew towards Mexico").
48. See EMISSION TRENDS, supra note 5, at 22, 39-44. Powerplants emitted about 19.4
million tons of SO. in 1970, nearly seen times their emissions in 1940. See id. at 39, 44.
Powerplants also create a severe nitrogen oxide (NOx) problem: they emitted about 4.7
million tons, or 20% of national NOx emissions in 1970. Id. at 44.
49. See EPA, BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR PROPOSED NEW-SOURCE PERFORMANCE STAN-
DARDS: STEAMt GENERATORS, INCINERATORS, PORTLAND CEMENT PLANTS, NiTRic ACID PLANTS,
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the 1970 Act required powerplants to burn scarce low-sulfur fuel or
develop technically formidable SO 2 controls, commonly known as
"scrubbers."50 As state plans were submitted and approved in 1972,
it soon became clear that there would be a massive shortage of coal or
oil clean enough to meet standards if scrubbers were not developed
quickly.51 Between 1972 and 1974, the feasibility of scrubbers emerged
as the major issue in the struggle between the EPA and the utilities
over compliance with S02 emission limitations.52 The agency con-
fronted technical objections in extensive public hearings in 197353
and followed in 1974 with a vigorous enforcement program. 4
Despite the early and well-publicized failures of several scrubber
SULFURIC ACID PLANTS 14 (1971) (35 fossil-fuel powerplants added each year) [hereinafter
cited as STEAM GENERATOR NSPS DOCUMENT]. Analyses presented during the 1970 hearings
on the Clean Air Act indicated a possible doubling of SO. emissions from powerplants
between 1970 and 1980 unless controls were imposed. See, e.g., Sherwood, supra note 6, at
1028-29.
50. See 40 C.F.R. § 50.5 (1977) (NAAQSs for SO.); 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.40-.46 (1977)
(powerplant NSPSs). EPA has proposed controversial revisions of this standard. See 43
Fed. Reg. 42,154 (1978) (explaining EPA rationale).
51. New-source standards for powerplants were set with regard to the "desirability of
setting sulfur dioxide standards that would allow the use of low-sulfur fuels as well as
fuel cleaning, stack gas cleaning, and equipment modifications." STEAM GENERATOR NSPS
DOCUMENT, supra note 49, at 7. See NATIONAL ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL, ASSESSMENT
OF THE STATE-OF-TECHNOLOGY OF AIR POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT AND OF THE IMPACT
OF CLEAN AIR REGULATIONS ON THE ADEQUACY OF ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY OF NORTH
AMERICAN BULK POWER SYSTEMS 11-4 to 11-5, 111-5 to 111-6 (1972) (noting probable
shortages of low-sulfur fuels); INTERAGENCY SULFUR OXIDE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT PANEL (SOCTAP), SOCTAP FINAL REPORT i, 68 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SOCTAP
REPORT]. By the end of 1972, only eight of more than 200 electric utilities in the United
States had begun demonstrating scrubbers. EPA, Office of Energy, Minerals and Industry,
Summary of the Operability of Flue Gas Desulfurization Technology 1-2 (Sept. 14, 1977)
(Report to the President's Office of Energy Policy and Planning) (on file with Yale Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as FGD Operability].
52. See, e.g., Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973) (remand of
state plan for consideration of technical feasibility issues); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA,
481 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1973) (remand of certain emission limitations for consideration of
feasibility). Several important SIPs were later vacated or modified in state courts or ad-
ministrative proceedings, exempting 102 of the nation's 394 coal-fired powerplants from
emission controls. EPA, EPA ENFORCEMENT: A PROGRESS REPORT, DECEMBER 1974 TO
DECEMBER 1975, at 11-12 (1976) (discussing legal difficulties of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois
plans, as well as other powerplant compliance problems) [hereinafter cited as ENFORCE-
MENT PROGRESS].
53. See EPA, REPORT OF THE HEARING PANEL: NATIONAL PUBLIC HEARINGS ON POWER
PLANT COMPLIANCE WITH SULFUR OXIDE AIR POLLUTION REGULATIONS (1974) [hereinafter
cited as HEARING PANEL REPORT].
54. See ENFORCEMENT PROGRESS, supra note 52, at 11-12. With considerably less pub-
licity, however, the EPA also encouraged states to revise and weaken state plans in
order to reduce demand for low-sulfur fuel or scrubbers. See EPA, EPA-450/3-75-053a, 1
NATIONAL SUMMARY OF STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN REvIEwS (SECTION 4 ESECA) 1-2, 6
(1975).
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demonstration programs, 5z the state and federal requirements forced
relatively rapid development, demonstration, and use of workable SO:,
control technology. At the time federal standards were set in 1971 for
new coal-fired powerplants, there were no commercially demonstrated
flue-gas-desulfurization (FGD) systems.5 6 The systems tested broke down
frequently and achieved removal efficiencies barely adequate to
achieve the standard.57 But by the time the EPA began to reevaluate
the powerplant standards in 1977, new model scrubbers operated prop-
erly about ninety percent of the time, up from about fifty percent
in 1971.51s Removal efficiencies improved from seventy-five percent in
1971 to better than ninety-five percent for some units in 1976.19
The SIP and NSPS standards made the crucial difference in forcing
the commercial demonstration of scrubber technology.60 The standards
forced control technology vendors and utilities to solve the difficult
design problems of sophisticated large-scale systems, 1 and allowed
vendors to transfer and demonstrate EPA and Japanese process-chemis-
try improvements on large-scale systems. 62 Both vendors and utilities
55. Two early systems failed full-scale tests: limestone injection systems failed at Union
Electric's Meramec plant during testing between 1968 and 1971 and catalytic oxidation
failed at Illinois Power's Wood River plant between 1972 and 1974. See FGD Operability,
supra note 51, at 2-1 to 2-3 (Meramec and Wood River scrubbers were only two full-scale
units discontinued solely because of severe operational difficulties).
56. See Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974) (scrubbers approached but did not achieve NSPS requirements).
57. See STEAM GENERATOR NSPS DOCUMENT, supra note 49, at 10-I1 (removal efficiency);
PEDCo ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIALISTS, INC., SUMMARY REPORT, FLUE GAS DESULFURIZATION
SYSTEMS, SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1976 at 35-199, 255-93 (describing FGD operations including
early operation difficulties) [hereinafter cited as PEDCo REPORT].
58. See FGD Operability, supra note 51, at 3-1. These operability figures of 90%
compare favorably with overall powerplant operability of 75% to 80%. Id. at 3-5. The
terms operability, availability, and reliability are often used interchangeably in reporting
scrubber operations. See PEDCo REPORT, supra note 57, at 307 (defining terms).
59. See STEAM GENERATOR NSPS DOCUMENT, supra note 49, at 10-11 (two 1971 demon-
stration units approached 73% removal efficiency); FGD Operability, supra note 51, at
Table 3-1 (noting nine units achieving 95% removal efficiencies some or all the time).
60. See FGD Operability, supra note 51, at 1-2 to 1-3, 2-1 to 2-3 (11 types of scrubbers
demonstrated in response to federal standards; several successful systems closed after regula-
tions weakened); note 67 infra (abandonment of costly but successful demonstrations).
61. COMMssION ON NATURAL RESOURCES, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, Air Quality and Stationary Source
Emission Control, SEN. SERIAL No. 94-4, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 386-88 (Public Works Comm.
Print 1975) (many problems not apparent until full-scale systems tested) [hereinafter cited
as NAS REPORT].
62. Process chemistry refers to the overall chemistry of scrubber operations; maintain-
ing the proper chemical balances in a full-scale scrubber presented difficult problems. See
id. at 386-88. Despite some substantial vendor efforts, EPA and Japanese demonstrations
were more successful than the vendors' in solving these process-chemistry problems. See
FGD Operability, supra note 51, at 3-1; SOCTAP REPORT, supra note 51, at ii, 1-3. As the
two tables, infra, illustrate, EPA has spent far more on scrubber development than the
vendors. (These figures slightly understate the vendors' role in emission-control innovation
because the Electric Power Research Institute subcontracts much of its work to them and
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tended to leave the difficult and expensive process-chemistry problems
to the EPA, however, concentrating instead on cheaper and easier
mechanical problems.0 3 In addition, utilities' work emphasized new,
low-polluting generating technology, just as the smelting companies
emphasized clean new production processes. 4
Although the state and federal requirements eventually stimulated
the critical demonstrations, they also created some severe difficulties for
potential innovators. The SIP requirements stimulated almost all the
private scrubber demonstrations before 1976, but the use of air-quality
because manufacturers incorporate new ideas into full-scale installations so that some
development costs are treated as a cost of sales and not reported as research. See Mcllvaine
Company, SOS, NO, and Particulate Research and Development and Installed Cost
Projections 8 (1977).)
TABLE 1: Vendors' Projected Scrubber and Particulate Control Demonstration Expendi-
tures (S Millions)
1977 1982
% Sales %Sales S
FGD Processes 3.5% 4.8 2.5% 10.9
Particulate Controls:
Fabric Filters 2.2% 4.4 2.3% 10.2
Precipitators 1.3% 3.0 1.4% 7.5
Total 12.2 28.6
Source: Mcllvaine Co., SOx, NOx, and Particulate Research and Development and In-
stalled Cost Projections 11 (1977).
TABLE 2: EPA SO. Emission-Control Demonstration Expenditures, 1970-76 (S Millions)
FGD Processes $81.4
Fluidized Bed Combustion $19A
Coal Cleaning $21.0
Source: Merilee Merimon & Bill Rice, Office of Energy, Minerals, and Industry, EPA (file
search December 1976).
Note: EPA's predecessor agency, the National Air Pollution Control Agency, spent about
$15 million on FGD work between 1967 and 1969.
63. See FGD Operability, supra note 51, at 3-1 (noting EPA process chemistry work;
vendor improvements in selection of materials); NAS REPORT, supra note 61, at 393-94, 456
(noting shortages of chemical engineers working for utilities); note 68 infra (same).
64. See ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EPRI RD-4, DIGEST OF CURRENT RESEARCH
IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 156-210 (1978) (summarizing new fossil-fuel processing
and generating demonstrations performed by or for utility industry under institute's
auspices). The Electric Power Research Institute also conducts major air pollution control
demonstrations, id. at 220-68, and will spend more than $65 million between 1979 and
1983 on this work, more than a tenth of its research budget for fossil fuel and advanced
systems demonstrations, EPRI, PS-831-SR, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PLAN FOR
1979-1983 at 2 (1978). This compares with $46 million spent by the entire industry on all
research in 1970. See FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, STATISTICS ON PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC
UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970 at 763 (1971).
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modeling or other crude methods of setting these limitations,Gz and the
possibility of revisions in the state plans, made litigation and political
opposition more attractive in many cases than innovation.GG State
revisions of emission limitations caused several promising scrubber
demonstrations to be abandoned. 67
The vulnerability of SIP emission limitations to challenge and
revision discourages utilities from conducting emission-control demon-
trations. Innovation is further hampered by utility ratemaking prac-
tices that limit the extent to which research expenditures can be
recovered. 68 From a utility's perspective, using low sulfur fuel is pref-
erable because it does not saddle the utility with useless and possibly
valueless capital equipment if the state requirements are weakened,
and because it allows expenses to be recovered quickly through fuel ad-
65. Air quality modeling generally refers to computer simulation of the ambient air
quality effects of pollutant emissions. The substitute Ohio plan promulgated by EPA in
1976 has been challenged specifically with regard to the accuracy of the air quality models
used to develop the emission limitations. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d
660 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1017 (1979) (disapproving certain aspects of
EPA's model); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 278 (1978) (upholding use of a different EPA model).
66. The American Electric Power Company, for instance, spent about $3.6 million in
1974 on controversial advertising attacks on scrubbers and government restraints on mining
low sulfur coal. These advertisements advocated the use of tall stacks instead of scrubbers.
See AMERICAN ELEcTRIC POWER, ANNUAL REPORT 1974 at 16-17 (1975) (text of 36 ads); Tele-
phone Interview with William Corbitt, Vice President, American Electric Power Co. (Jan.
6, 1977) (estimating costs of ads at about $100,000 each) (notes on file Yale Law Journal).
The long absence of SO. emission controls in Ohio's SIP demonstrates the success of
unrelenting opposition to controls. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d
1150, 1156-57 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 278 (1978) (noting long absence of controls).
The Ohio Environmental Board of Review found that the Ohio EPA's "main motivation"
in proposing weakened emission controls "was to seek an accommodation with the electric
utility companies and other large industrial sources." 5 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 898-99 (1974).
67. See FGD Operability, supra note 51, at 2-I to 2-3 (identifies eight successful
demonstrations abandoned in part because actual or anticipated regulations were
weakened, permitting compliance without scrubbers).
68. Utilities favored burning low-sulfur coal instead of using scrubbers because fuel
costs could be recovered immediately through automatic fuel adjustment clauses but
scrubber construction costs could not be recovered until construction was completed and
rate increases were approved in hearings by the state public utility commission. See
ENFORCEMENT PROGREss, supra note 52, at 11; HEARING PANEL REPORT, supra note 53, at 1,
8, 10; Ayres, supra note 4, at 446-47, 463-64. Utility willingness to demonstrate vendors'
advanced technologies, including advanced controls, strongly affects the rate of innova-
tion, see Hughes, Scale Frontiers in Electric Power, in TECHNOLOGCAL CHANGE IN REGU-
LATED INDusTrsEs 44-45 (W. Capron ed. 1971), because electric utilities cannot have cor-
porate links with equipment manufacturers and so cannot profit from the sale of the
technologies they successfully demonstrate, see Public Utility Holding Act of 1935, § 13,
15 U.S.C. § 79m (1976) (barring corporate links). Thus utilities moved too slowly in the
1960s to build the necessary technical staffs to handle the engineering requirements of
nuclear power equipment orders; the pattern repeated itself with FGD equipment in the
early 1970s. SOCTAP REPORT, supra note 51, at 66-67.
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justment clauses. SIP deadlines tend to reinforce this preference for
low-sulfur fuel over innovative capital expenditures. 69
In contrast to the uncertainties attending SIP emission limitations,
the federal new source performance standards for new fossil-fueled
powerplants confronted utilities with a single standard for emissions
from those plants. Challenging the NSPSs proved less attractive and
effective than SIP challenges because the Act had settled the issue of
which plants had to meet the standards by requiring all new ones to
do so, and because the standards themselves were based on reasonably
determinable facts: the capabilities of the most advanced emission-
control system affordable by the industry. Confronted with the choice
between the long-term use of low-sulfur fuel or installation of scrub-
bers, a number of utilities chose to install scrubbers on their new
plants.70
By the time these new plants came on line in 1975 and 1976, how-
ever, scrubbing technology had advanced to the point where the new-
source standards for powerplants could be achieved routinely; build-
ing these scrubbers to meet new-source standards did less than earlier
state-induced demonstrations to advance control technology capabili-
ties. Moreover, new source requirements discouraged utilities from
seeking further improvements in removal efficiency, because these im-
provements might then serve as the basis for expensive new stan-
dards.7 1 Although EPA undertook scrubber demonstrations72 and the
states imposed SIP emission limitations more stringent than NSPS
requirements, 73 barriers to innovation still existed.
C. Economic and Political Limitations of Technology-Forcing
The experiences of the copper smelting and electric power industries
demonstrate that emission-control innovation can be forced but that
69. See Ayres, supra note 4, at 463-64.
70. Between 1975 and 1977, 13 new powerplants came on line with scrubbers, seven of
which had to meet state emission limitations stricter than NSPS requirements. Confronted
with these stricter standards, some of these plants commercially demonstrated limestone/
flyash scrubbing, an important system for low-sulfur western coals. See PEDCo REPORT,
.sutra note 57, at 5-8 (identifying stringency of regulations facing each scrubber installa-
tion); FGD Operability, supra note 51, at 1-2, 1-3 (identifying systems as new or retrofit
and specifying system type).
71. Office of Energy, Minerals, and Industry, EPA, The Federal Program in Coal
Cleaning 5 (Aug. 29, 1977) (report to the President's Office of Energy Policy and
Planning) (NSPSs "discourage [research] efforts by coal users, since control technology
breakthroughs will not be used to reduce costs, but to tighten standards.") [hereinafter
cited as Coal Cleaning Report]. Of 27 scrubbers installed before 1975, only three were
installed on new sources. See FGD Operability, supra note 51, at 2-1.
72. Of seven utility scrubber demonstrations begun in 1972, four were funded in
whole or in part by EPA. SOCTAP REPORT, supra note 51, at 21, 23, 30.
73. See note 70 supra.
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current SIP requirements and NSPSs sometimes impede innovation.
The states' reliance on individually tailored emission limitations im-
pedes innovation because it necessarily creates uncertainties about the
permanence and stringency of these limitations, and so encourages
litigation, political opposition, and technical hesitation. These uncer-
tainties, concerning both the size of the market for technologically im-
proved pollution controls and the market's technical requirements, in-
crease investment costs.7 4 As the case studies establish, uncertainties
increase the risks of emission-control innovation, making higher profits
necessary to attract investment. Thus, increased risk discourages innova-
tion. Although vigorous enforcement can overcome these problems, the
primary goal of enforcement officials is compliance and not tech-
nology-forcing.75 Consequently, enforcement officials will often be
tempted to decrease emission limitations to routinely achievable levels
in exchange for swift compliance.7 6 Such compromises seem inevitable,
and occasionally appropriate, but they severely limit the technology-
forcing effectiveness of SIP and NSPS enforcement.
The new source requirement reduces these uncertainties by setting
an industry-wide technical goal for a clearly defined market: all new
plants. The NSPS penalizes polluting firms that demonstrate improve-
ments over NSPS, however, because these improvements become the
basis for expensive new standards applied to the firm's future plants.
71
The 1977 Amendments attempted to solve these problems by over-
coming the regulatory lag in revising NSPSs. The Amendments did
so by requiring periodic revisions and by requiring that all new
facilities face case-by-case determinations of the best available control
technology to be used, with the NSPS serving as the minimum stan-
dard.78 These case-by-case determinations are similar to the combina-
74. Aggravation or reduction of market uncertainty is particularly important since
"according to the results of four empirical studies, between two-thirds and three-quarters
of innovations are initially stimulated by a clear definition of market needs." ORGANIZA-
TION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS IN
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 12 (1971).
75. See EPA, EPA-450/3-75-053a, 1 NATIONAL SUMMARY OF STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
REVIEWS (SECTION 4 ESECA) 1, 6 (1975) (EPA officials encouraged states to weaken SIP
requirements for many powerplants under agency's "clean fuels" policy); notes 26, 54
supra (discussing enforcement).
76. Bargaining over emission limitations between the state agency (or EPA) and the
affected source seems inevitable. Regulators will tend to bargain away technology-forcing
requirements for compliance with lesser standards. The bargaining tendency was verified
in the water pollution control context. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON WATER QUALITY,
STAFF DRAFT REPORT, V-S0 (1975).
77. See ILA PIERRE, supra note 4, at 774; Coal Cleaning Report, suPra note 71, at 5.
78. See p. 1717 sura.
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tion of SIP and NSPS requirements that hastened demonstration of
scrubbers on Western powerplants.7 9
Despite these statutory changes, federal emission control demonstra-
tions must still play a significant role in overcoming the barriers to
innovation caused by the new-source standards. Control technology
vendors are usually too small to demonstrate innovative control tech-
nologies on a commercial scale without cooperation by the affected
industry.80
Both state emission limitations and federal new source standards
generally state their requirements as performance standards: specified
emission limitations that must be achieved by a certain date.8' Con-
gress chose this form of expressing standards instead of specifying
control technology in order to avoid "freezing the state of the art."82
Although performance standards do not discourage emission control
innovation in general, the compliance deadlines discourage capital in-
tensive means of compliance for existing plants.8 3 The case studies
79. See note 70 supra (discussing flyash scrubbers).
80. Although historically vendors developed many utility innovations, improvements
such as new combustion methods are now too expensive for any single vendor, utility, or
group of vendors to develop. See Oversight Hearings: Coal Combustion R.D.&D. for
Utility Powerplants and Industrial Users: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Energy
Research, Development and Demonstration (Fossil Fuels) of the House Comm. on Science
and Technology, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 635-36 (1975) (Electric Power Research Institute
submission). Federal demonstration efforts, however, cannot overcome these vendor
problems alone. The expense of conducting numerous full-scale demonstrations is too great,
see Bonine, supra note 3, at 9-10 (discussing congressional failures to appropriate sums
authorized for demonstrations); Ayres, supra note 4, at 465, and federal demonstrations do
too little to build vendor or utility expertise in the construction and operation of innova-
tive emission controls. See FGD Operability, supra note 51, at 3-1, 3-5, 6-2 (discussing im-
proved scrubber design and operability with increased utility experience with FGD).
81. See, e.g., note 50 supra (powerplant NSPS); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v.
EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 278 (1978) (Ohio SIP emission
limitations expressed as performance standards). "Standards of performance" refers to the
degree of emission control that can be achieved through process changes, operation
changes, direct emission control, or other methods. S. REP'. No. 1196, supra note 6, at 417.
82. S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 6, at 417 (EPA Administrator should not make tech-
nical judgment as to how standard should be implemented); see id. at 409 (not commit-
tee's intention to lock in control technology); Air Pollution-1970 (Part 2): Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 454-63 (1970) (statement of Aaron Teller) (need for control technology
innovation and dangers of locking in control technology).
83. The compliance deadlines favor expensive process changes such as the use of low
sulfur fuel, rather than cheaper but more capital-intensive control equipment like
scrubbers. See p. 1727 supra (SIP deadlines favor low sulfur fuel use). In addition, the
deadlines favor use of package control technologies like scrubbers, which can be added
to existing types of production technology, rather than capital-intensive changes in
production technology itself. Fundamental process changes such as fluidized-bed combus-
tion or new smelting processes usually take too long to develop and install. See Letter of
Richard Pendleton, supra note 43 (time needed for fundamental process changes). Even
though NSPSs give compliance extensions for development and use of innovative controls,
the compliance deadline "is much too short to allow significant depreciation of capital ...
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establish, however, that there is a strong tendency towards capital-
intensive controls in new plants, where there is time to build funda-
mentally clean production processes.84
III. Improved Technology-Forcing: A Proposal
The case studies illustrate the economic and political difficulties of
the Clean Air Act's technology-forcing provisions. Two fundamental
decisions of the Act-to rely on ambient air quality standards and on
state-by-state air quality control-also create technology-forcing diffi-
culties.
A. Limitations on SIP Technology-Forcing
1. Limitations of Ambient Air Quality Standards
If the achievement of primary and secondary national air quality
standards fully prevented air pollution damage, the SIP process, with
all its faults, might force control technology improvements sufficent
to maintain such protection. But NAAQSs, particularly secondary
NAAQSs,8 5 do not and cannot reflect some important types of air
pollution damage, because certain kinds of damage are caused much
more by the quantity of pollutant emitted than by the pollutant con-
centration.
Secondary NAAQSs were supposed to set pollutant concentrations in
ambient air low enough to protect the public "from any known or
anticipated adverse effects of air pollution-including effects on soils,
water, vegetation, man-made materials, animals, wildlife, visibility[,]
climate, and economic values."80 The secondary standards do not and
cannot state proper levels for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide (NO.)
pollution, however, because damage occurs at any level of emission.
Although these substances cause severe problems when their concentra-
tions exceed ambient standards, significant problems also result from
[and so does] not provide any 'real incentive to build a commercial facility that has
potential benefits but a finite risk of not achieving performance standards." Steven
Reznek, Domestic Policy Review of Industrial Innovation 36 (1978) (EPA Office for
Energy, Minerals, and Industry). The compliance deadlines and performance standards
also discourage capital intensive process changes such as physical coal cleaning, which
generally cannot achieve standards without using scrubbers but have significant economic
and emission control benefits. See Coal Cleaning Report, supra note 71, at 1-7. This
effect is unfortunate because such process changes can often significantly reduce com-
pliance costs. See id. at 3-4; cf. Reznek, supra, at 19-21 (process changes and savings
in water pollution control).
84. See notes 42 & 64 supra (discussing concentration on new process demonstrations).
85. Clean Air Act, § 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409(b)(2) (West Supp. 1978).
86. S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 6, at 411.
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the quantity of total emissions. Acid rainfall is an especially good
example of this.87 Similarly, other kinds of air pollution damage may
be abated only through large reductions of total SO 2 emissions. Most
SO., emissions break down into sulfate pollutants that can, at pollutant
concentrations much lower than SO2 standards, cause both serious
health problems and regionwide reductions in visibility.88 To com-
pound the difficulty, these sulfate pollutants travel many hundreds of
miles, making proper monitoring, modeling, and enforcement impos-
sible. Thus severe air pollution damage will continue even if NAAQSs
are met.
2. Limitations of State-by-State Control
Reliance on state-by-state air quality regulation has two institutional
limitations that may impair technology-forcing. First, reliance on SIPs
permits state law to undermine achievement of the federal statutory
objective of technology-forcing. In Union Electric, the Supreme Court
held that so long as states did not interfere with the primary congres-
sional purpose of promptly attaining national air quality standards, the
states could consider technological and economic infeasibility claims.8 9
Stationary sources may raise these infeasibility claims before state
agencies when SIPs are formulated,90 seek variances from states at a
later time (subject to EPA approval),9 ' or raise these claims in the
state courts.92 These claims have been advanced with some success as
87. Normal rainfall is slightly acidic because of atmospheric carbon dioxide and
resultant carbonic acid. Acid rainfall in the eastern states has been increasing with in-
creases in SO and NOx emissions, NAS REPORT, supra note 61, at xxvii, and now ad-
versely affects most of the United States east of the Mississippi River, id. at 302-03.
Powerplant SO. and NOx emissions are the primary source of these problems, largely
because tall stacks promote long-distance transport of these emissions and conversion to
sulfate and nitric acid. See id. at 281-85. Although sulfates account for most of the rain-
fall acidity, nitric acid now accounts for about a quarter, and this share continues to
increase. See id. at 302-03. This rainfall causes several hundred million dollars worth of
damage annually, from serious water pollution, crop and forest damage, damage to ma-
terials, and disruption of ecosystems. See STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON THE ENVIRONMENT
AND THE ATMOSPHERE, REvIEw OF RESEARCH RELATED TO SULFATES IN THE ATMOSPHERE,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as SULFATE RESEARCH RE-
VIEW]; USDA FOREST SERVICE, GENERAL TECHNICAL REPORT NE-23, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIRST INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON ACID PRECIPITATION AND THE FOREsT ECOsYsTEM (1976)
(discussing acid rainfall problems in North America and Europe and impacts on forests).
88. See NAS REPORT, supra note 61, at 181-82 (visibility); SULFATE RESEARCH REvIEw,
supra note 87, at 13-16 (potentially serious health effects of sulfates).
89. 427 U.S. at 266.
90. Id.
91. Id.; Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
92. Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 266-67 (1976); Commonwealth Edison Co.
v. Pollution Control Bd., 25 111. App. 3d 271, 286-88, 323 N.E.2d 84, 95-96 (1974), aff'd on
other grounds, 62 I1. 2d 494, 343 N.E.2d 459 (1976).
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a bar to enforcement of state standards.9 3 These claims may also be
used to delay federal enforcement: federal district courts sometimes
abstain from enforcement, pending state action.94 Although it may be
appropriate in some cases to grant variances or to abstain from enforce-
ment, these practices, like the bargaining inherent in enforcement
actions, will limit the effectiveness of state technology-forcing.
The second limitation of state technology-forcing is that state plans
do not adequately address interstate air pollution problems. States have
no incentive to impose controls to abate problems in downwind
states.9 5 The most severe interstate air pollution problems, such as acid
rainfall, present extraordinarily difficult air quality modeling problems
because of both the long distances that pollutants travel and the com-
plex chemistry involved.96 These kinds of problems will be resolved
only through national reductions in S02 and NO, emissions. Failure
to address these interstate problems will place severe limitations on the
continued effectiveness of technology-forcing.
B. Emission Penalties and Technology-Forcing
If technology-forcing is to provide the control technology necessary
to achieve Congress's objective of preventing air pollution damage
93. See Commonwealth Dep't of Environmental Resources v. Pennsylvania Power Co.,
461 Pa. 675, 337 A.2d 823 (1975) (opinion of Jones, C.J., one justice concurring, four
justices concurring in result) (impossibility is defense to contempt proceedings brought to
compel utility installation of SO. and particulate matter controls). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court effectively exempted the utility from state emission limitations. See Com-
ment, Technology Forcing Under the Clean Air Act: The Electric Utility Dilemma, 38
U. Pirr L. REV. 505, 525-26 (1977). The court did so two years after EPA concluded that
scrubber technology had been demonstrated, eliminating any dilemma. See HEARING PANEL
REPORT, sukra note 53, at 27-30. The Pennsylvania courts have narrowly construed this
decision and have not permitted technical infeasibility claims to be raised as a defense to
the enforcement of consent decrees for the cleanup of coke ovens and steel mills. See
Commonwealth Dep't of Environmental Resources v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 469 Pa. 578,
367 A.2d 222 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977) (holding consent decree enforceable
during period where firm seeks modification from administrative agency); Rochez Bros.,
Inc. v. Dep't of Environmental Resources, 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 137, 146, 334 A.2d 790, 796
(1974) (construing lower court decision in Pennsylvania Power to permit impossibility
defense only in contempt proceedings).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Interlake, 429 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
95. States may petition the EPA Administrator for action against sources in other
states that violate the petitioning state's standards. Clean Air Act, § 126(b), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7426(b) (West Supp. 1978). Pennsylvania has requested the EPA to study the adverse air
quality impacts on Pennsylvania caused by Ohio and West Virginia powerplant SO,
emissions. See Letter from Maurice K. Goddard, Dep't of Environmental Resources, to
Douglas Costle, EPA Administrator (Dec. 13, 1977), reprinted in TEKNEKRON, INC., IM-
PACT OF LONG-RANGE TRANSPORT OF POLLUTANTS ON AIR QUALITY IN THE COMMONWEALTH
OF PENNSYLVANIA: INTERIM REPORT A-12 to -13 (1978). EPA has not yet issued regulations to
implement this provision.
96. See NAS REPORT, supra note 61, at 4-14 (discussing atmospheric chemistry); SULFATE
RESEARCH RE IEW, supra note 87, at 5-8 (same).
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completely,"7 it must have a legal basis and enforcement mechanism
in addition to existing state plans and new-source standards. In order to
provide an effective basis, both the EPA and Congress must recognize
that, regardless of pollutant concentrations, the total quantity of SO2
and NOx emissions0 8 creates severe environmental problems that will
continue and grow despite industry compliance with primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards.
Congress should overcome present limitations on technology-forcing
by amending the secondary NAAQS provision"0 to require private
emission-control demonstration spending equivalent to the pollution
damage that would be caused by SO2, NOx, and other emissions after
present ambient standards are met.10 This demonstration require-
ment should be imposed by means of a uniform national emission
penalty for each relevant pollutant.' 0 ' Each source's required spending
would be based on total annual emissions multiplied by the appro-
priate penalty rates.' 02 Money not spent on EPA-certified demonstra-
tions would be paid into the federal treasury.10 3
97. See p. 1732 supra.
98. See id. & notes 94-95 supra.
99. Clean Air Act, § 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409(b)(2) (West Supp. 1978).
100. In order to force innovation by sources emitting hazardous air pollutants as
defined under § 112 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (West Supp. 1978), § 112's
standards are similar in form to new-source standards, and like them may retard innova-
tion in the control of dangerous emissions. The experience of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration in regulating carcinogens in the workplace and the severe prob-
lems OSHA has confronted concerning economic and technological feasibility strongly
suggest the need for innovation in the control of these hazardous emissions. See Berger
& Riskin, Economic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating Toxic Substances Under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 285, 311-21, 346-58 (1978) (dis-
cussing feasibility problems of various OSHA standards for carcinogens).
101. There are three reasons for this national approach: the technological benefits of
demonstrations are national, the environmental damages involved spread across many
states, and a national approach is consistent with the Clean Air Act's strong policy against
regional discrimination. The Act strongly emphasizes national standards. Clean Air Act,
§§ 109, 111, 112, 202, 211, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7409, 7411, 7412, 7521, 7545 (West Supp. 1978).
102. The primary purpose of this approach is to force continued commercial demon-
strations of full-scale emission controls or fundamentally clean production technology, so
the full penalty rate should be phased in over several years in order to give affected
firms time to carry out orderly demonstration programs. If the full penalty rate were
charged in the initial years, the affected industries would have difficulty spending much
of the penalty on demonstrations, since demonstration efforts take time to plan and
perform.
Although joint efforts should not be entirely forbidden, they must be closely mon-
itored to prevent deliberate obstruction of technical progress as well as antitrust viola-
tions. See, e.g., United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
aff'd per curiam sub nom. New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970) (allegations of
antitrust violations by retarding auto emission control innovation); J. Esposrro, supra note
5, at 43-47 (background on suits against Automobile Manufacturers Association).
103. This approach is consistent with the delayed compliance penalty and enforcement
provisions of the Act, which permit sources to write off compliance costs against the
delayed compliance penalty, or avoid the penalty for three years by using innovative
controls. Clean Air Act, §§ 120(d), 113(d)(1), 113(d)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7420(d), 7413(d)(1),
7413(d)(4) (West. Supp. 1978).
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The EPA already has some authority that could be used to require
private demonstration commitments either in relation to the degree
of noncompliance, 10 4 or, in the case of some pollutants in some cir-
cumstances, in relation to pollutant damage. 0 5 The agency should
undertake rulemaking under these provisions to induce the appropriate
demonstration commitments.
This emission penalty approach would place technology-forcing on
a predictable economic basis'06 and overcome the inherent technology-
forcing problems of uncertainty, state law delay, and failure to address
interstate air pollution damage . 7 Additional environmental damage
would not be profitable because demonstrations would have to be
conducted or compensation for the damage paid to the government. By
creating financial incentives to conduct emission-control demonstra-
tions, emission penalties may overcome the profound antipathy that
new source standards foster in the private sector toward such research. 08
Congress's statutory attempt to compel private emission-control in-
novation was successful. This statutory effort would work more ef-
fectively, however, if demonstration requirements were linked to dam-
ages in a predictable fashion.
104. The EPA has authority under the delayed compliance penalty provision, non-
ferrous smelter order provision, and nonattainment area provisions that could be used
to require demonstration commitments in proportion to the degree of noncompliance.
See p. 1718 suPra (discussing delayed compliance penalties); note 47 supra (discussing
nonferrous smelter orders); p. 1717 supra (nonattainment area requirements).
105. The EPA's prevention of significant deterioration regulations concerning NOx,
hydrocarbons, photochemical oxidants, and carbon monoxide must provide a "framework
for stimulating improved control technology." Clean Air Act, § 166(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7476(c)
(West Supp. 1978).
106. The polluter's obligations would be easily determined because the formidable
problem of estimating national damages would have been conclusively, if crudely, solved
by the EPA. EPA might bypass these formidable estimation problems for the first few
years of the program by simply calculating the cost of a reasonable research program
for each industry and apportioning the costs on the basis of emissions. In the interim,
the agency could develop defensible data and methods to estimate damages, at least for
SO2 and NOx. For toxic pollutants, it might prove impossible to estimate damages in
money terms so that using reasonable program costs as the basis for charges may be the
only practical approach. See Berger & Riskin, supra note 100, at 286-87 (setting standards
for toxic chemical exposures defies use of traditional cost-benefit analysis techniques).
But see American Petroleum Inst. v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 581
F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3541 (U.S. Feb. 2, 1979) (No. 78-911).
107. EPA has not distinguished itself for its speed in setting standards, see note 8
suPra (NSPS delays), but once a national standard is set, further delay will not occur in
the states.
108. See p. 1728 supra. The emission penalty system would widen the focus of
technology-forcing to include not only the package control technologies, such as scrubbers,
emphasized by performance standards, but also capital-intensive process changes that
have some subsidiary emission-control benefits. Emission penalties, unlike performance
standards, provide explicit financial incentives to develop and apply more capital-intensive
improvements.
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